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in my paper i investigate collective intentionality (Ci) through the “Ought” implies “Can” 
(OiC) principle. my leading question is does OiC impose any further requirement on Ci? 
in answering the challenge inside a Searlean framework, i realize that we need to clarify 
what Ci’s structure is and what kind of role the agents joining a Ci-act have. in the last 
part of the paper, i put forward an  (inverted) hartian framework to allow the Searlean Ci 
theory to be agent sensitive and cope with the problems that emerged.
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in this paper i will work on collective intentionality (ci) from the slightly 
odd point of view of the “ought” implies “can” principle (oic)1. my leading 
question will be: what are the relationships between ci and oic? 
in answering it, i will use oic to formulate a challenge to Searlean ci.
my starting hypotheses are:
1. oic is not so certain as a principle as it has often been claimed2;
2. oic, nonetheless, forces the ci theory to consider each agent’s 
possibility concentrating more on the structure of ci and not only on 
its conceptual role in social ontology3;
3. there can be possible interactions between oic and ci.
thus, investigating ci through oic provides us with:
1. good reasons for having a more accurate recognition of the 
role of the agents both in the creation of deontic powers and their 
acceptance and recognition;
2. a challenge raised by oic – the oic challenge – of whether oic 
imposes more conditions and requirements on the agents that are 
willing to create deontic powers with a ci-act4;
3. extra reasons for a better conceptual analysis and clarification 
of the oic principle that, as commonly stated, can hardly play the 
role we asked it to play in the previous point5.
Before starting this research on ci using oic, a few words on the principle 
are needed.
1  a principle that perhaps is better known in its latin formula impossibilium nulla obligatio and 
ad impossibilia nemo tenetur (aint) or as “nobody is obliged to do the impossible”.
2  i am sympathetic to the critics of oic – see below, section 2 – because i think the principle is 
often used to prove much more than it can prove. despite my critical approach to oic, i think it 
can provide us with new insights on ci.
3  Searle (2010) addressed just the latter problem. his question was: do we need ci? What is its 
role in social ontology? he then investigates ci and its relationships with language and individual 
intentionality, but does not investigate the “engineering question” concerning its structure (is it 
a network? can we picture a graph of it? What kind of graph is it? how does information spread 
into ci?).
4  i think this challenge arises at least when oic is interpreted as a higher order norm or a 
criterion as, for example, in Stockhammer (1959), moritz (1968), von Wright (1985).
5  as i have said before, even if oic principle in its standard formulation is weak, i think the 
question it raises on ci are worth considering and i will attempt to answer them even before we 
have developed a full account of oic.
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traditionally, what we now call the “ought” implies “can” principle is 
considered part of the kantian philosophy and sometimes, especially in 
deontic logic, is referred to as “kant’s axiom”6. Besides this philosophical 
tradition, the latin juridical tradition attests ad impossibilia nemo tenetur 
(aint) and impossibilium nulla obligatio.
the standard reading of oic comes really close to the meaning of the latin 
aint formulation following three steps: 
1. “ought” implies “can”,
then by contraposition rule
2.  “no can” implies “no ought”
that you can read as aint 
3. “nobody is obliged to do the impossible”.
in the legal perspective, oic is used as a criterion for normative 
requirements that prevents the legislator from issuing impossible 
commands or norms. aint ensures that, in a legal system, the agents – who 
recognize the system as their system and act under the deontic powers of 
the system – have the possibility to bring about what the system requires to 
them. 
thomas Besch (2009) has distinguished a normative and a factualist 
interpretation of oic.
the normative interpretation uses oic to impose duties: it starts from our 
possibilities to act and then imposes normative requirements, i.e. given that 
we know that you have this “can”, you “ought” (to do what you can). 
the factualist interpretation is close to aint: it subordinates the normative 
requirements to the possibility of acting. in case we miss the possibility to act 
(“no can”) we will have no corresponding “ought”.
i will use the oic factualist interpretation to formulate a challenge to ci.
6  For papers concerned with the history of oic and whether kant really meant this see: Stern 
(2004). tranøy (1972, 1975) traces the kantian attribution to the reading of henry Paton of kant's 
metaphysics of morals. oic is named “kantian principle” by (Prior 1957, 142). (Baumgardt 1946, 
100) harshly denies OIC to be Kantian. The first occurrence of OIC as a title of a paper is O. J. 
russell (1935) but, surprisingly, it is not a discussion of the topics of aint.
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here i am assuming oic as a good starting point but it has been hugely 
criticized at least in the following ways:
1. if the “implies” states a logical implication7, oic has troubles to 
work in the normative realm, because it is very difficult to find truth 
values for normative entities;
2. we may come up with situations where we feel a genuine 
impossibility or a true dilemma and where, still, we have an 
obligation. this is the standard scheme to build counterexamples 
against oic8.
as we have seen, oic principle is usually interpreted as a criterion for 
commands or normative statements: if you want to succeed in issuing 
normative requirements, you have to give the agents chances of bringing 
about what you are ordering. as a consequence of this, impossible 
commands (i.e. commands ordering something impossible) are absurd9.
the premise to formulate the challenge is the following: normativity 
plays an important role in issuing commands, regulating behavior and 
constructing a legal system. now, given that Searle discusses normativity 
under the heading of “deontic powers”, deontic elements (i.e. normativity 
and deontic powers) are the link between oic and ci.
going back to ci, we know that every ci-act involves deontic powers and that 
deontic powers are normative. this leads us to the oic challenge to ci:
does oic impose further conditions on ci-acts in order for them to 
successfully create ci-products (institutional facts, status functions 
and so on) with which the agents can go along?
this question matters to social ontology: if oic holds also in social ontology, 
it will prevent the assignment of status functions that create deontic powers 
that ask impossible things and it will avoid the creation of status functions 
that are impossible to be maintained. We know that:
1. the factualist oic requires that, in order to have an “ought”, the 
7  this fact pushes us towards a better understanding of what “ought”, “implies” and “can” 
mean in oic.
8  martin (2009) calls them “ought, but cannot”. Feld man (2000) proposes “role oughts” – i.e. 
duties related to social functions – as sources of ought, but cannot. the best paper to have an idea 
of all the critics to oic and possible replies is vranas (2007).
9  See (rescher 1966, 17).
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agent should have the relevant “can”.
2. ci creates normative elements.
thus we can expect that:
(t1) the oic application will add further conditions on ci-acts and the 
creation of deontic powers.
Before considering whether t1 has relevant consequences we have to face 
this problem: in order to apply oic to ci-agents that act under deontic 
powers, we have to know what they can and cannot do, in the different 
meanings of “can” (i.e: their range of possibilities).
this presupposes that:
1. We have a taxonomy of different “can”, i.e. of the different 
possibilities (material, cognitive, physical, epistemical, and so on);
2. We are able to recognize both the agents who perform the 
creation of deontic elements and the agents who act under the 
deontic elements and maintain them.
A full taxonomy of possibilities is something really difficult to exploit and, 
as it is not part of the Searlean debate, i will leave it aside10.
regarding point (2), as we know from  Searle’s reply of 2003 to Barry Smith 
about conflicting boarders, Searle is not interested in understanding who 
is really counting something as y in the real world. he just says, from a 
theoretical point of view, that “the creation of institutional facts requires 
that people be able to count something as something more than its physical 
structure indicates” (Searle 2003, 301).
i think this lack of interest for real world situation is one of Searle’s  theory 
weaknesses. going at the same abstraction level of Searle – i.e. avoiding 
historical examples as the one of boards –, i think his theory has no answer 
for solving conflicting attributions of status functions. Imagine CI is split 50% 
vs. 50% on attributing status function SF to X1 or X2 or that we are arguing for 
whether it is SF1 or SF2 that we have to attribute to X. Searle (2010) used status 
functions declarations to solve counterexamples to his social ontology theory 
10  (Southwood and chuard 2009, 614) are well aware of the “can” problem: “there are the 
“cans” associated with different notions of possibility: logical, metaphysical, nomological, 
epistemic, psychological, etc”. they then list can of: ability, feasibility, availability.
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but, even with status functions declarations he has no decision procedure to 
solve the problematic abstract cases i proposed. i think structuring ci can 
help us in solving such an issue and that (computational) social sciences have 
a method to move in that direction11.
caring about the structure of ci will end up giving details on who are the 
agents joining ci and will help us in answering two questions concerning 
the relationships between oic and ci:
1. how does oic apply to the agents performing a ci-act that 
creates deontic powers?
2. how does oic apply to the agents acting under the pressure of 
deontic powers and maintaining the ci-act products?
now that i have established a connection between oic and ci using 
normativity, formulated a hypothesis (t1) concerning the upshots of such 
a connection and raised two questions, it is time to start investigating the 
problems.
I will first (section 4) answer the questions (1) and (2) above from a Searlean 
point of view: i will show that a factualist non restricted oic is a too weak and 
vague principle to be considered as a criterion that imposes further conditions 
both on ci-acts and on ci-products maintenance.
in the last part of the paper (section 5), i will argue that, even if ci can escape 
this first OIC challenge, we can formulate a better OIC challenge that may lead 
us to use the agent-sensitive approach i will sketch.
i will start with examples showing ci situations creating deontic powers 
(oughts) that – contra oic – hold even though the agents are in a “no can” 
situation because they lack a certain kind of possibility.
i think that these simple examples will show that the ci-agents are able 
to create deontic powers (“oughts”) that cannot be removed by means of 
an impossibility (“no can”) of the agent to perform what is issued by the 
deontic power. this will show that the factualist oic does not hold on ci 
and adds no further conditions on ci-acts, thus denying t1.
let us consider these situations:
(1) someone parking the car where it is forbidden because he does not 
11  i think graph theory and network analysis are a good way to capture the structure of ci. For 
an introduction on these tools see (easley and kleinberg 2010).
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know that parking there is forbidden. The agent is fined even if he 
does not know he could not park there; 
(2) someone cognitively unable to park a car (because he lacks skills 
and ability) that parks outside the parking lines. The agent is fined 
because parking outside the lines is prohibited, no matter if he is 
unable to park.
the agents in (1-2) face an impossibility when they are sanctioned. the agents 
are responsible for their own failures but, when they are contested their 
failures, it is impossible for them to accommodate their failure into a success. 
they cannot all of a sudden move their car into the right parking lot.
given that there are impossibilities, we can apply the factualist oic 
claiming that the agents have “no ought”, because they are facing “no 
can” situations: (1) has an epistemic impossibility, (2) has a practical 
impossibility. Both (1) and (2) have a physical and logical impossibility to 
avoid the fine by parking their car in the right way after they received the 
fine. So, the OIC factualist may say, the drivers have now “no ought” to 
park in the right and proper way because of their “no can” (impossibilities) 
and are not to be fined. 
despite this, we do not accept such a use of the impossibility (“no can”) 
to remove obligations (“ought”). the problem is that a non restricted 
factualist oic does not say that a “no can” for which the agent is 
responsible cannot be accepted as a “no can” to remove an “ought”.
the examples show how a misuse of a non restricted factualist oic is 
possible and that oic can be turned, from a guarantee to the agents that 
prevents a legal system to ask them the impossible into a tool that destroys 
any “ought”.
if this is the oic we are using in the oic challenge, Searle might rightly 
claim that such a principle has no right to impose any conditions on ci 
before we avoid the possibility of misusing it.
however, if we agree that a better formulation of oic is possible12, the oic 
12  this formulation will lay down conditions so that only “relevant” impossibilities will be 
acceptable “no can” to remove an “ought”. The problem is to lay down these conditions, define 
“impossible” and its relationship with “(no) can”. i do not pretend to solve these problems. i am 
just assuming that OIC somehow works fine, as a lot of the literature says, and use it to address 
new questions concerning ci.
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challenge strikes back and can have relevant application. consider, for 
example, the case of higher-order social constructions (the one where you 
iterate the “X counts as y” formula). 
We know that there are meanings of “can” related to our cognitive, practical 
and epistemic capacities13. i think it is hard to claim that all the agents 
involved in acting and maintaining global finance or politics have the 
possibility to understand what is going on there (considering all the relevant 
possibilities of “can”). When a new financial regulation is passed, we may 
face both epistemic “no can” (we do not know about the new regulation) 
and cognitive “no can” (think about how hard it is reading your bank’s 
newsletter explaining you some changes responsible for higher fees).
nonetheless, the sum of all the impossibilities of the bank customers, 
non professional market agents and citizens14 is not enough to destroy 
the deontic power (oughts) related to the institution of money15. this is 
quite puzzling: these agents, even if passive, are the majority and they 
are maintaining the ci products created by the ci-act of a minority of 
agents. the majority of the agents is maintaining an “ought” even if, when 
confronted with the “ought” and its normative powers, they face “no can” 
situations16.
this should surprise us. the idea in oic of preventing a social institution 
to demand the impossible is not so easy to be dismissed. it is somehow 
shocking to discover that Searle’s  ci theory allows some agents to be in 
“no can” situations while maintaining some ci-products (“oughts”).
i will now try to extend the Searlean framework so that it can be agent-
sensitive. i propose to recognize and track who are the agents of every ci-
act, outlining also who are the agents maintaining the deontic powers. the 
theoretical tool to pick the agents up may be called and “inverted hartian rule 
of recognition” (ror)17.
13  e.g. “i can speak Japanese”, “he can hit 3 aces per game”, “We cannot prove goldman's. 
conjecture”.
14  this numerical majority can be said to be somehow passive in the ci-act. the problem is 
that Searle's  ci theory does not structure nor weights the participation of people to ci using 
parameters such as passive/active nor does it clearly states minimal requirements for the 
maintenance of institutions (number of agents, social position, and so on…).
15  neither to undermine collateral institutional activities related to money such as banking 
activities or forex trade.
16  “no can” situations are different from attempts to withdraw from an institutions, going along 
with an institution or explicitly denying it (as in Searle's 2010 example of “Bush is not my president”).
17  the rule is stated in hart (1961).
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hart had the problem of identifying the sources of a legal system made only of 
commands and said that a society can use a secondary rule, ror, to see what 
are the effective primary rules that are in force in the society. the standard 
ror – positively stated inside the legal system – was directed from agents to 
rules, and the function was to spot and select which rules belonged to the 
corpus of the system.
my inverted ror, as the original, is positive and empirical, it forces the 
creators of the new status functions and deontic powers to be aware of what 
conditions they are imposing when making a ci-act and to whom they are 
imposing them.
the inverted ror goes from deontic powers to the agents that perform 
the ci-act and then to the agents that perform the ci-maintenance of the 
products of the CI-act. The function of the rule is to spot and select firstly 
the agents who perform the ci-act that creates the deontic powers and 
secondly the agents that are maintaining the functions and the deontic 
powers that have been created. With such a rule, given some kind of deontic 
power, you can theoretically investigate who was to create the status 
function and who is maintaining it. in this framework you are able to treat 
difficult situations concerning status functions imposition and deontic 
powers attribution (the ones happening when ci is split 50% vs. 50%) that 
Searle’s  ci theory ignored.
you are also able to identify cases where agents are in “no can” situations 
but are still maintaining an “ought”. these cases go against oic and, once 
you discover them, you may revise the corresponding “ought” and the 
deontic powers in order to avoid the “no can” situations.
in this framework, the oic challenge can be met by requiring, through the 
use of the inverted ror, that the agents performing ci-acts have to be aware 
of who are the agents that will maintain the ci-products and of their range 
of possibilities. 
With the inverted ror we gain a tool that allows not only a theoretical 
possibility of analysing the structure of the ci network, but also a more 
technical and applied insight where we can map, with network analysis, the 
dynamics of ci. 
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Unfortunately, a full development of this hartian framework inside 
Searle’s  theory requires more work (how does this Hartian rule fit Searle’s  
description of the creation of the social world? is there a place for such a 
rule inside Searle’s  theory of rules?)
Despite the difficulties, I think that approaching the normative side of CI 
through oic helps in raising challenging questions about both ci and oic: 
my answers are just the first step towards an applied and informative social 
ontology or, in Searlean terms, philosophy of the society.
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